#### CS165 – Computer Security

Memory Errors October 18, 2024

1

### Memory Errors

- $\Box$  Bugs in C/C++ programs can cause memory errors
	- **□ C/C++ does not ensure memory safety**
- $\Box$  Memory errors and the ability to exploit them have been known for over 50 years
	- **■** And exploited in practice since the Morris worm (1988)
- **□ Microsoft and Google report that over 70% of** vulnerabilities are still from memory errors

## Cause of Memory Errors

- **3**
- $\Box$  In C/C++, objects and their memory references are separate things
	- **□ Memory references: Pointers**
	- **□ Objects: Dynamically allocated on stack and heap**
- $\Box$  Memory references and object allocations do not always correspond to each other
	- $\Box$  C/C++ (try to) use pointers to reference the memory locations of memory objects
	- **□** The values (memory locations) of pointers may be assigned independently from object allocations

### Impact of Memory Errors



# C/C++ Memory Model

 $\Box$  C allows programmers to access memory flexibly

**□** Like a giant array of virtual memory



**□** An object (in brown) can be allocated anywhere in the array

char  $*_{X}$  = (char  $*$ ) malloc(size);

- Your program gets a reference (pointer) to the location of your object in the "array" that is virtual memory
	- If it is up to the programmer to set and use the pointer correctly to access the object
	- **n** I.e., the programmer must keep them "in sync"

# Memory and Type Safety

- Bugs in  $C/C++$  programs can cause memory errors
	- C/C++ does not ensure memory safety
		- A pointer (reference) assigned to an object is not restricted to that object's memory region
	- C/C++ does not ensure type safety
		- A pointer (reference) assigned to an object is not restricted to that object's data type
- $\Box$  We will look at the causes of memory errors **<u>n</u>** And a little bit about how to avoid them

**□** An object (in brown) can be allocated anywhere in the array

char  $*_{X}$  = (char  $*$ ) malloc(size);



 $0 \t 2<sup>n</sup> - 1$ 

 $\blacksquare$  Pointer arithmetic

 $\blacksquare$  x = x+n;

 $\blacksquare$  What happens?

**□** An object (in brown) can be deallocated at any time

char  $*_{X}$  = (char  $*$ ) malloc(size);



 $\blacksquare$  Deallocate memory associated with the pointer  $\times$ 

```
\blacksquare free (x);
```
**E** What does the "free" command do?

■ An object (in brown) can be deallocated at any time

char  $*_{X}$  = (char  $*$ ) malloc(size);



 $\blacksquare$  Deallocate memory associated with the pointer  $\times$ 

**n** free  $(x)$  ;

- **What does the "free" command do?** 
	- Allow the memory region at  $x$  to be reused by another allocation

■ An object (in brown) can be deallocated at any time

char  $*_{X}$  = (char  $*$ ) malloc(size);



 $\blacksquare$  Deallocate memory associated with the pointer  $\times$ 

 $\blacksquare$  free  $(x)$ ;

■ What happens when the following is run after the "free"?

strcpy(x, "string");

■ An object (in brown) can be deallocated at any time

char  $*_{X}$  = (char  $*$ ) malloc(size);



 $\blacksquare$  Deallocate memory associated with the pointer  $\times$ 

 $\blacksquare$  free  $(x)$ ;

■ What happens when the follow is run after the "free"?

strcpy(x, "string");

 $\blacksquare$  "string" is written at location x, even if something else has been allocated there

# C/C++ and Type Safety

**□ An object (in brown) can be assigned a type** 

char  $*_{X}$  = (char  $*$ ) malloc(size);



 $\blacksquare$  More specifically, the pointer is assigned a type

- $\blacksquare$  In this case, an array of 1-byte objects
- **□** Used to interpret the values in the memory region

 $\blacksquare$  E.g., as a string

# C/C++ and Type Safety

#### **□ An object (in brown) can be assigned a type**

char  $*_{X}$  = (char  $*$ ) malloc(size);



**■** But, we can assign another pointer to reference the same memory using a different type (type cast)

lint  $*_{y}$  = (int  $*_{)x}$ ;

- **□** Say an integer is 4 bytes, so the value is the first 4 characters assigned to the "string"
	- $\blacksquare$  Nothing limits you in C
	- $\blacksquare$  Other languages do prevent this kind of type cast

# C/C++ and Type Safety

#### ■ An object (in brown) can be assigned a type

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**■** But, we can assign another pointer to reference the same memory using a different type (type cast)

lint  $*_{y}$  = (int  $*_{)x}$ ;

- **□** Say an integer is 4 bytes, so the value is the first 4 characters assigned to the "string"
	- So, you cannot trust that a memory region's type (i.e., of the values assigned there) corresponds to the type of the pointer used to access the region  $-$  not type safe

# Memory Safety Classes

**□** Are typically defined in terms of three classes

char  $*_{X}$  = (char  $*$ ) malloc(size);

$$
\begin{array}{c|c}\n\hline\n0 & 2^n-1\n\end{array}
$$

**□ Spatial safety: Accesses within bounds (space)** 

 $\Box x = x+n$ :

**□ Type safety: Accesses comply with object format** 

```
\n
$$
\text{strcpy}(x, \text{``foo''});
$$
\n\nint *y = (int *)x;\n\ny = y+1;\n
```

■ Temporal safety: Access are within object lifetime (time) n free( x );  $\Box y = y+1;$ 

## Spatial Error Vulnerability

#### $\Box$  This code has a flaw

```
#include <sub>stdio.h></sub>int function( char *source)
₹
  char buffer[10];
  sscanf( source, "%s", buffer );
  printf( "buffer address: %p\n\n", buffer );
  return 0;
ł
int main( int argc, char *argv[] )₹
  function(argv[1]);
ł
```
## Spatial Error Vulnerability

- □ Suppose an adversary can provide "source"
	- May be larger than the memory space of "buffer"

```
#include <sub>stdio.h></sub>int function( char *source)
  char buffer[10];
  sscanf( source, "%s", buffer );
  printf( "buffer address: %p\n\n", buffer );
  return 0;
int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
ł
  function(argv[1]);
ł
```
## What Is Happening?

#### $\Box$  Fill buffer to length of allocated buffer (10)  $\blacksquare$  scanf – Has no termination

# What is happening?

#### $\Box$  Fill buffer to length of allocated buffer (10) ■ scanf – input a string (source) of length 5

**□ Null termination of string (optional)** 

# What is happening?

 $\Box$  But, the string source may be  $>=10$  bytes  $\blacksquare$  10 bytes – no room for the terminator byte

■ Write beyond the end of the allocated memory for buffer

**■** Nothing stops that

■ What is beyond the end of one allocated region?

# What is happening?

But, the string source may be  $>=10$  bytes  $\blacksquare$  10 bytes – no room for the terminator byte

■ Write beyond the end of the allocated memory for buffer

**■** Nothing stops that

- What is beyond the end of one allocated region?
	- Other objects that should not be accessed
	- Called a spatial memory error

## More Complex Vulnerability

#### $\square$  Another flaw

```
#include <stdio.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include \leqstring.h>
#include <unistd.h>
struct test {
  char buffer[10];
  int (*fnptr) (char *, int );
\};
int function( char *source)
₹
  int res = 0, flags = 0;
  struct test *a = (struct test*) malloc(sizeof(struct test));
  printf( "buffer address: %p\n\n", a->buffer );
  a \rightarrow f \cdot f = open:
  strcpy( a->buffer, source );
  res = a \rightarrow f \nleftrightarrow (a \rightarrow b \nleftrightarrow f \nleftrightarrow f \nleftrightarrow gprintf( "fd \frac{1}{2} %d\n\n", res );
  return 0;
ł
int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
  int fd = open("stack.c", 0_CREAT);function(argv[1]);
  exit(0):
\}
```
### What Is Going Wrong?

#### □ Both of these functions process "strings"? ■ What is a string?



### What Is Going Wrong?

- □ Both of these functions process "strings"?
- $\square$  What is a string?
	- Sequence of bytes terminating with a null byte
- $\Box$  But, C/C++ do not differentiate strings from arrays of bytes (char \*)
	- ¤ Which need not be null-terminated
	- ¤ What happens then?

### What Is Going Wrong?

- □ Both of these functions process "strings"?
- $\square$  What is a string?
	- **□** Sequence of bytes terminating with a null byte
- $\Box$  But, C/C++ do not differentiate strings from arrays of bytes (char \*)
	- Need not be null-terminated
	- **□** What happens when you read a string w/o a null-<br>terminating byte?
- $\Box$  String functions keep reading until they hit a null byte

### String Issues

#### $\square$  Issues with C/C++ arrays of bytes

- May be longer than memory region (bounds)
- **□** May not be terminated by a null byte (bounds)
- May be terminated before expected (truncate)
- $\Box$  Each of these issues may lead to problems  $\blacksquare$  If undetected

## Obvious Solution in C

#### □ "Obvious" solution is to always enforce bounds



### Function w/o Bounds Checks

- $\Box$  gets(3) reads input without checking. Don't use it!
- ¨ strcpy(3) *strcpy(dest, src)*  copies from *src* to *dest* **□** If *src* longer than *dest* buffer, keeps writing!
- ¨ strcat(3) *strcat(dest, src) –* appends *src* to *dest* **□** If src+data-in-dest longer than dest buffer, keeps writing!
- $\Box$  Many other dangerous functions, e.g.:
	- $\blacksquare$  realpath(3), getopt(3), getpass(3)
	- $\blacksquare$  streadd(3), strecpy(3), and strtrns(3)

#### □ Don't use these!

# Traditional Solutions

 $\Box$  Depend mostly on strncpy(3), strncat(3), sprintf(3)

- **□ Can be hard to use correctly**
- char \**strncpy*(char \*DST, const char \*SRC, size\_t LENGTH)
	- **n** Copy bytes from SRC to DST
	- Up to LENGTH bytes; if less, NULL-fills
- $\Box$  If LENGTH is the size of the DST memory region
	- **□ Can fill memory region without null-terminator** 
		- **n** Thus, does not guarantee creating a C string
	- **□ Can truncate "in the middle," leaving malformed data** 
		- $\blacksquare$  Yet difficult to detect when it happens

 $\Box$  Not a correct solution

# strncpy(buffer, "0123456789", 10)

 $\Box$  Strncpy stops the copy after 10 bytes

 $\blacksquare$  Since buffer is 10 bytes – no room for the terminator byte

**□** Prevents any write beyond the end of the allocated memory for buffer if the "size" argument is correct

 $\blacksquare$  But, nothing guarantees that

### Traditional Solution – That Works!

 $\Box$  Available now: snprintf(3), vsnprintf(3) **□** Essentially the same functions, although arg format differs □ int *snprintf*(char \*S, size t N, const char \*FORMAT, ...); **□** So, you should use this for safe programming today **□** Replaces strcpy and others directly



### Traditional Solution – That Works!

- □ int *snprintf*(char \*S, size t N, const char \*FORMAT, ...);
	- Writes output to buffer S up to N chars (bounds check)
	- **□** Always writes '\0' at end if N>=1 (terminate)
	- Returns "length that would have been written" or negative if error (reports truncation or error)
- $\Box$  Thus, achieves goals of correct bounds checking
	- **□** Enforces bounds, ensures correct C string, and reports truncation or error
		- len = snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s", original value);
		- $\blacksquare$  if (len < 0 | | len >= buflen) ... // handle error/truncation

## Scanf and Friends

#### $\Box$  What about other functions like scanf? ■ scanf, fscanf, sscanf, vscanf, vsscanf, vfscanf  $\blacksquare$  all unsafe by default

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 $\Box$  What about other functions like scanf?

- scanf, fscanf, sscanf, vscanf, vsscanf, vfscanf
	- $\blacksquare$  all unsafe by default
- Fortunately, these can be made safe quite easily
	- **n** By leveraging auto-resizing option

# Scanf and Friends

#### $\Box$  What about other functions like scanf?

- scanf, fscanf, sscanf, vscanf, vsscanf, vfscanf
	- $\blacksquare$  all unsafe by default
- **□** Instead, use "%ms" to auto-resize
	- n char \*buffer = NULL;  $\frac{1}{2}$  Must be set to NULL
	- scanf(buffer, "%ms");
- Allocates memory for the buffer dynamically to hold input safely – null-terminated, no truncation required
- $\Box$  Note: also, can use for other functions that process input like getline
- $\Box$  Note: You need to deallocate when completely done

### Type Errors

- $\Box$  Errors that permit access to memory according to a multiple, incompatible formats
	- $\blacksquare$  These are called type errors
	- Access using a different "type" than used to format the memory
- $\Box$  Most of these errors are permitted by simple programming flaws
	- $\blacksquare$  Of the sort that you are not taught to avoid
	- **E** Let's see how such errors can be avoided
- $\Box$  Some of the changes are rather simple
### Other Error Prone Type Casts

## $\Box$  Downcasts – Cast to a larger type; allows overflow

- $\blacksquare$  t1 \*p, t2 \*q;  $\blacksquare$
- $\blacksquare$  p = (t1 \*) malloc(sizeof (t1)); // allocate t1 object, define p
- $\Box$  p $\rightarrow$  field = value;  $\Box$  // suppose this is an int field
- $\Box$  q = (t2 \*)p;  $\qquad$  // downcast, t2 is a larger type
- $\Box$  q $\rightarrow$  extra= value2; // overflow memory of object
- $\Box$  E.g., t2 is a child type of t1
	- $\blacksquare$  So, the size of type t2 is greater than the size of type t1
	- $\blacksquare$  "extra" field is added to the type t1 to create type t2

### $\Box$  "p" is assigned to an object of type t1



 $\Box$  Only memory large enough for t1 is allocated





 $\Box$  But, if we assign a pointer of type t2 to the object



- $\Box$  This is what can be referenced by "q"
	- "q" of type t2 thinks it is referencing a larger region





 $\Box$  But, if we assign a pointer of type t2 to the object



 $\Box$  What will happen when the program accesses " $q \rightarrow$ extra"?

### What Can Go Wrong?

### $\Box$  Downcasts – Cast to a larger type; causes overflow  $\blacksquare$  t1 \*p, t2 \*q;  $\blacksquare$  $\blacksquare$  p = (t1 \*) malloc(sizeof (t1)); // allocate t1 object, define p  $\Box$  p $\rightarrow$  field = value;  $\angle$  // suppose this is an int field  $\Box q = (t2^*)p$ ; // down cast, t2 is a larger type  $\Box$  q $\rightarrow$  extra = value2; // overflow memory of object  $\Box$  By downcasting to the larger type t2 with the "extra"

- field, gives the adversary the ability to read/write beyond the memory region allocated
	- $\blacksquare$  Memory region is "sizeof(t1)" in size

### $\Box$  Many effective attacks exploit data of another type

```
struct A { 
struct C *c;
char buffer[40];
};
struct B {
int B1;
int B2;
char info[32];
};
```
#### $\Box$  Adversary can abuse ambiguity to control writes



```
struct B {
int B1;
int B2;
char info[32];
};
```
#### $\Box$  Adversary can abuse ambiguity to control writes



```
struct B {
int B1;
int B2;
char info[32];
};
```
#### □ Arbitrary Write Primitive!

■ Adversary controls the value to write and the location of the write

■ Allow adversary to write an arbitrary value to an arbitrary location

#### $\Box$  Type A is unrelated to type B



### $\Box$  Type A is unrelated to type B



 $\Box$  Type casting "x" to be referenced by "y" of type B



 $\Box$  Why could this become a problem?

### $\Box$  Type A is unrelated to type B



 $\Box$  Type casting "x" to be referenced by "y" of type B



 $\Box$  The code allows assignment of field B1

### $\Box$  Type A is unrelated to type B



 $\Box$  Type casting "x" to be referenced by "y" of type B



 $\Box$  The code allows assignment of field B1 of y, which corresponds to field c of x

#### $\Box$  Adversary can abuse ambiguity to control writes



```
struct B {
int B1;
int B2;
char info[32];
};
```
#### □ Arbitrary Write Primitive!

■ Adversary controls the value to write and the location of the write

■ Allow adversary to write an arbitrary value to an arbitrary location

# Who Would Do That?!

□ How could such an error happen?

# Who Would Do That?!

- $\Box$  How could such an error happen?
- □ Several ways
	- **□** Type casts
	- $\blacksquare$  Unions use the same memory with multiple formats
	- **□** Use-before-initialization (UBI)
	- **□** Use-after-free (UAF)
- $\Box$  The last two are due to bugs created because C/C++ requires the programmer manage memory
	- ¤ Temporal errors



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#### □ Example of a union data structure

**Defining a union typed variable:**



**Observe that:**



http://www.cs.emory.edu/~cheung/Courses/255/Syllabus/2-C-adv-

data/union.html#:~:text=A%20union%20data%20structure%20is,variables%20at%20any%20one%20time



#### $\Box$  Example of a union data structure

We can **easily** show the above **facts** with the following **C program**:

```
 union myUnion // Union structure
 {
    int a;
    double b;
    short c;
    char d;
 };
 struct myStruct // Struct with the same member variables 
 {
    int a;
    double b;
    short c;
    char d;
 };
 int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 {
    struct myStruct s; // Define a struct
    union myUnion u; // and a union variable
    // Print the size and the address of each component
    printf("Structure variable:\n");
    printf("sizeof(s) = %d\n", sizeof(s) );
   printf("Address of s.a = \{u \mid n", \{(s,a)\}\};
   print(f''Address of s.b = %u\nu', & (s.b) );
```

```
printf("Address of s.c = <math>\{u \mid n", \delta(s.c) \}</math>);printf("Address of s.d = %u\n", & (s.d) ); putchar('\n');
 printf("Union variable:\n");
printf("sizeof(u) = %d\nu", sizeof(u) ;printf("Address of u.a = <math>\{u \mid n'', \ \&(u.a) \})</math>;
```

```
printf("Address of u.b = <math>\{u \mid n'', \ \& (u.b) \})</math>;printf("Address of u.c = <math>\nu \nightharpoonup \nu</math>, <math>\varepsilon(u.c)</math>) ;printf("Address of u.d = <math>\nu \nightharpoonup</math> u. (u.d)) }
```
**Output:**

```
http://www.cs.emory.edu/\mu -adverses/2014.com/courses/20is,variables%20is,variables%20at%20any%20is,variables%20is,variables%20is,variables%20at%20at%20is,variables%20is,variables%20at%20any%20unione%20time Page 2 of 4 
                                                                                                                      Structure variable: 
                                                                                                                      sizeof(s) = 24 
                                                                                                                      Address of s.a = 4290768696
                                                                                                                      Address of s.b = 4290768704
                                                                                                                      Address of s.c = 4290768712
                                                                                                                      Address of s.d = 4290768714
                                                                                                                      Union variable: 
                                                                                                                     sizeof(u) = 8 Address of u.a = 4290768688 (Same location !!!) 
                                                                                                                      Address of u.b = 4290768688
                                                                                                                      Address of u.c = 4290768688
                                                                                                                      Address of u.d = 4290768688
```
http://www.cs.emory.edu/~cheung/Courses/255/Syllabus/2-C-advdata/union.html#:~:text=A%20union%20data%20structure%20is,variables%20at%20any%20one%20time



### $\Box$  Are there any type casts that are type safe? ■ What do we mean by "type safe"?

## Safe Casts

- $\Box$  Are there any type casts that are type safe?
	- What do we mean by "type safe"?
- $\Box$  Allocate memory that includes all the fields that will be accessed by any pointer

## Allocating the Largest Type Used

$\Box$ Type t1	$\ln t$	$\ln t$	
'p'	$\Box$ F1	$\Box$ F2	$\Box$ F3

 $\Box$  Type t2



- $\Box$  If we allocate an object of type t2
	- Then accesses via "p" and "q" are within bounds and access the same fields

## Safe Casts

- $\Box$  Are there any type casts that are type safe?
	- What do we mean by "type safe"?
- $\Box$  Allocate memory that includes all the fields that will be accessed by any pointer
	- In this case, all casts are an "upcast" of the allocated type (i.e., have the same or fewer fields)
	- **■** And all the fields are in the corresponding locations and have the same type
	- **■** Like casting a child class to a parent class in OOP

# Temporal Memory Errors

- $\Box$  Exploit inconsistencies in the assignment of pointers to memory regions
	- ¤ Use-before-initialization
		- **n** Prior to a pointer being assigned to an object (memory region)
	- ¤ Use-after-free
		- $\blacksquare$  Use a pointer in a statement after the memory region to which has been assigned has been deallocated
			- $\blacksquare$  And something has been allocated there in its place
- $\Box$  The most common vector for exploits today

# Memory Life Cycle

- $\Box$  We have objects (memory regions) and references (pointers)
	- **What goes wrong in temporal errors?**
- $\Box$  A pointer may reference (use) a memory region that does not hold the object to which the pointer was assigned
- $\Box$  Normal lifecycle between a pointer and object
	- char \*p;  $\blacksquare$  declare pointer
	- $\blacksquare$  p = (char \*) malloc(size); // define pointer to object
	- $\blacksquare$  len = snprintf(p, size, "%s", original value); // use pointer **□** free(p);  $\blacksquare$  deallocate object

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## What Is Going Wrong?

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	- **What goes wrong in temporal errors?**
- $\Box$  A pointer may reference (use) a memory region that does not hold the object to which the pointer was assigned
- □ What does "p" reference upon use?
	- char \*p;  $\blacksquare$  declare pointer
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	- $\blacksquare$  p = (char \*) malloc(size); // define pointer to object
	-
	- **□** free(p);  $\blacksquare$  deallocate object

## Use-Before-Initialization (UBI)

- $\Box$  A pointer may reference a memory region that does not hold a defined (assigned) object
- □ What does "p" reference upon use?
	- **□** char \*p;  $\blacksquare$  declare pointer
	- $\blacksquare$  len = snprintf(p, size, "%s", original value); // use pointer
	- $\blacksquare$  p = (char \*) malloc(size); // define pointer to object **□** free(p);  $\blacksquare$  deallocate object
- □ Called "use before initialization" (UBI)
	- Allows an adversary to reference a value that happens to be at the location that "p" is declared (not an assignment)
	- $\blacksquare$  Could be anywhere

### Why UBI Is A Problem

#### $\square$  Use before initialization



#### $\Box$  Questions to explore

#### ■ Where is the pointer allocated in memory?

- $\blacksquare$  Can the adversary control what is written to that location
- What is the pointer's value at initialization?
	- $\blacksquare$  Can this reference a useful target object to attack?

## Why UBI Is A Problem

### $\square$  Use before initialization



 $\square$  Assume function "A" calls functions "B" and "C"

- When function "B" is called, a new stack frame is created
- **<u>■</u>** Using memory in the stack region
- **□** Suppose there is a string "buffer" built from adversary input
- **□** Then, function "B" returns

### Why UBI Is A Problem

#### $\square$  Use before initialization



- $\square$  Assume function "A" calls functions "B" and "C"
	- When function "C" is called, a new stack frame is created
	- $\blacksquare$  Using memory in the stack region used by function "B"
	- Suppose there is a local variable pointer "ptr" declared in function "C"
	- $\blacksquare$  But, "ptr" is not initialized what is the value of "ptr"?

### Prevent UBIs

#### $\square$  Is there a way to prevent UBI vulnerabilities?

### Prevent UBIs

 $\square$  Is there a way to prevent UBI vulnerabilities? **□ Simple: initialize your variables** 

**E** Pointers and data

## What Is Going Wrong?

- $\Box$  We have objects (memory regions) and references (pointers)
	- **What goes wrong in temporal errors?**
- $\Box$  A pointer may reference (use) a memory region that does not hold the object to which the pointer was assigned
- $\Box$  What does "p" reference upon use?
	- **□** char \*p;  $\blacksquare$  declare pointer
	- $\blacksquare$  p = (char \*) malloc(size); // define pointer to object
	- $\blacksquare$  free(p); // deallocate object release memory for reuse
	- $\blacksquare$  len = snprintf(p, size, "%s", original value); // use pointer

## Use-After-Free (UAF)

- $\Box$  A pointer may reference a memory region that does not hold a defined (assigned) object
- □ What does "p" reference upon use?
	- **□** char \*p;  $\blacksquare$  declare pointer
	- $\blacksquare$  p = (char \*) malloc(size); // define pointer to object
	- $\blacksquare$  free(p); // deallocate object release memory for reuse
	- $\blacksquare$  len = snprintf(p, size, "%s", original\_value); // use pointer
- □ Called "use after free" (UAF)
	- **□** Allows an adversary to reference a memory region that may be allocated to a different object
	- **□** I.e., imagine a malloc between the free and use

### Why Is UAF a Problem

#### $\Box$  Use after free



#### $\Box$  Assume you have a heap as shown

- **E** Focus on object "B"
- $\blacksquare$  You have a reference to "B" say pointer "b"

## Why Is UAF a Problem

#### $\Box$  Use after free



 $\Box$  Assume you have a heap as shown

#### ¤ Object "B" is deallocated

- $\blacksquare$  And you still have a reference to "B" e.g., pointer "b"
- And, pointer "b" may have "uses" after the deallocation of object "B"
- **□ But, the allocator is free to reuse the memory region**
## Why Is UAF a Problem

#### $\Box$  Use after free



- $\Box$  Assume you have a heap as shown
	- **□** The allocator chooses to use the memory region for object  $''\mathsf{D}''$
	- So, a "use" of pointer "b" will access the object "D" instead **□ Leak: Can read information in Obj D (even if another user's)**
	- **□ Attack: Can modify information in Obj D (maybe pointers!)**

### Prevent UAFs

#### $\square$  Is there a way to prevent UAF vulnerabilities?

## Prevent UAFs

- $\Box$  Is there a way to prevent UAF vulnerabilities?
	- **□ Simple: zero pointers when freeing them**
	- Their use (after freeing) will cause a crash, but cannot be exploited

# Conclusions

- $\Box$  Memory errors are still the most common cause of vulnerabilities
- $\Box$  They are caused by C/C++ allows objects (memory regions) and pointers (references to memory locations) to be defined and managed separately
- $\Box$  Thus, C/C++ are neither memory safe nor type safe
- $\Box$  Which leads to spatial, type, and temporal errors

### Questions

